Mathematical knowledge as object of teaching-learning processes undergoes changes in its epistemological status. In primary and secondary schools:
1. What distinguishes mathematical knowledge in the discipline for researching experts and in general education for students learning mathematics?
In a socio-scientific empirical study, Bettina Heintz (2000) has elaborated the modern mathematical proof as the decisive tool for the increasing unambiguousness in the professional communication of mathematics researchers. Her analysis shows that a changing concept in the relation between the 'objects' and the 'conceptual structures' has been essential in the history of mathematics. "In the course of the 19 th century, the 'naïve abstractionism' of earlier mathematics was overcome and replaced by objects, which are defined in an exclusively mathematically-internal way. This work on the concepts had also become urgent because mathematicians increasingly use concepts, which could no longer be understood as idealisations or abstractions arising from empirical experience, but had an exclusively fictional character. . . . In the course of this 'theoretisation' (Jahnke 1990) or 'deontologisation' (Bekemeier 1987 , p. 220) of mathematics, concepts, which until then had been postulated as self-evident, were successively questioned and transferred into an explicit system. . . .
In the course of this conceptual reflection and reconstruction, essential parts of mathematics lost their natural and illustrative character. Those mathematicians who back then breached tradition and put theoretical, as orthodox critics claimed, 'artificial' constructs in the place of the 'natural' given, were still fully aware of the breach they conducted" (Heintz 200, p. 263, 264) .
Abandoning the given empirical, illustrative objects and constructing idealised mathematical objects by means of defining conceptual relations made a strict, doubtless basis for reasoning on which the unambiguousness of mathematical argumentation could develop and thus became a precise communicative body of rules between professional mathematicians (Heintz 2000, p. 221). Given objects and immediate view can be interpreted in many ways and can lead to opposite conceptions. "Even when arguments are deductively constructed and argue with the help of logical rules, when these arguments require a common knowledge and rely on intuition and visualization they are more at risk of dissent than a formal argumentation which one can hardly avoid even if it is contrary to intuition and experience." (Heintz 2000, p. 274) .
Even though ontological or idealised object features do not play an explicit role within official professional mathematical communication, i. e. within the frame of the well-rehearsed communicative body of rules of proof (cf. Heintz 2000, p. 221), one can assume that every single mathematician in his consciousness or in his private world of thought (Heintz 2000, p. 220 ff.) does not avoid such conceptions about the mathematical 'object' completely when working on mathematical argumentations.
Within the professional mathematical communication, unambiguous conceptual structures and relations take precedence. "In contrast to content-related axiomatic, formal axiomatic avoids a qualification of the axioms as regards content. . . . Axioms are conceptions of a hypothetical kind, whose truth of content is not up for debate. Axioms are true if no contradiction arises from them, and the same is true for the existence of mathematical objects. . . " (Heintz 2000, p. 265) .
Such a strictly professional communication, aiming at abstract structures, is not a priori possible for students who stand at the beginning of learning and understanding mathematics. The learning student cannot be directly compared to a professional researching mathematician. A mathematical expert has long years of experience in mathematical communication with colleagues and has acquired routine in the interactive negotiation of the correctness of a mathematical thesis, by means of using the communicative body of rules of formal proof. Also, such professional communications aim at the consistent mathematical product in question in a comparably direct way. The learning student, however, is faced with the demand of developing and then perfecting such forms of mathematical communication together with his fellow students; this process of development is essentially influenced by cultural aspects of the instruction process, by subjective instruction conditions, by cognitive means, by exemplary and situative mathematical frames and interpretations, and therefore, diversity and ambiguousness in understanding and interpreting mathematical knowledge receive priority within the processes of developing, learning and imparting mathematics (cf. Steinbring 2009, pp. 187ff).
As opposed to professional mathematical communication, instructional mathematical communication must carry out a different weighting when it comes to the relation between 'conceptual structures' and 'object'. This is because mathematics instruction is also about introducing the students to an insightful participation in the specific forms of mathematical communication. The self-evident and problem-free use of the well-rehearsed communicative body of rules remains and is a long-term goal to be aimed at by the learning student on his way of becoming a mathematically thinking and communicating person. For this purpose, the particular conditions of the developing communication of learning students within mathematics instruction must be reconstructed with a focus on the particular characteristics of mathematical communication.
If for the professional mathematician the conceptions about the ideal mathematical object are of a rather private nature and reserved to his individual world of thought, for the beginning learner, concrete, illustrative conceptions about the mathematical object as regards content are an important first basis of understanding for developing conceptual structures and relations, and such illustrative conceptions must be reflected together in the classroom communication in an explicit way.
On this basis of an illustration-bound interpretation of mathematical knowledge, an access to, an understanding and a use of mathematics as it is necessary for politically mature and active citizens in a modern society can develop for the broad majority of learning students who will not become mathematical experts later on. A mathematical layperson must have learned such mathematical competences, which allow him to question mathematical statements, models and uses within his social, economic, political etc. context critically and in a general yet mathematically competent way. Students must in their later lives as mature citizens be able to communicate with mathematical experts as well as to ask critical questions and to understand and evaluate the expert answers. 2. Mathematical knowledge as a ready made product or as a process of students' own learning activities?
Freudenthal (1973) has emphasized the process character of mathematics for learning in a paradigmatic way: "It is true that words as mathematics, language, and art have a double meaning. In the case of art it is obvious. There is a finished art studied by the historian of art, and there is an art exercised by the artist. It seems to be less obvious that it is the same with language; in fact linguists stress it and call it a discovery of de Saussure's. Every mathematician knows at least unconsciously that besides ready-made mathematics there exists mathematics as an activity. But this fact is almost never stressed, and non-mathematicians are not at all aware of it" (Freudenthal 1973, p. 114) . Mathematics, as an activity, implies that learning becomes an active process in the construction of knowledge. "The opposite of ready-made mathematics is mathematics in statu nascendi. This is what Socrates taught. Today we urge that it be a real birth rather than a stylized one; the pupil himself should reinvent mathematics. . . . The learning process has to include phases of directed invention, that is, of invention not in the objective but in the subjective sense, seen from the perspective of the student" (Freudenthal 1973, p. 118) .
Such a conception that mathematical knowledge is not appropriately characterised when it is seen mainly as a finished product, and when therefore the side of the mathematical activity and process is neglected, also plays an important role in the context of mathematical research and in the history of mathematics. For the learning of mathematics, however, the perspective that an already elaborated and finished mathematics is delivered to the children, sometimes dominates.
In order to understand and to realize Freudenthal's request for the learning of mathematics in school, it is helpful to understand the respective characteristics of the cultural context in which mathematics development processes and activities take place. The concept of the cultural surroundings or the mathematical culture is intended to help illuminate the question about the particular epistemological status of mathematics in school teaching and learning processes.
Different authors have highlighted the importance of the culture concept for scientific mathematics as well as for school mathematics (Wilder 1981 , Bishop 1988 ). Wilder (1986) characterises the concept of culture as follows: "A culture is the collection of customs, rituals, beliefs, tools, mores, etc., which we may call cultural elements, possessed by a group of people, such as a primitive tribe or the people of North America. Generally it is not a fixed thing but changing with the course of time, forming what can be called a 'culture stream'. It is handed down from one generation to another,. . . " (Wilder 1986 , p. 187).
The use of symbols as well as the way of reading and interpreting them represent a characteristic trait of every culture. "Without a symbolic apparatus to convey our ideas to one another, and to pass on our results to future generations, there wouldn't be any such thing as mathematics -indeed, there would be essentially no culture at all, since, with the possible exception of a few simple tools, culture is based on the use of symbols. A good case can be made for the thesis that man is to be distinguished from other animals by the way in which he uses symbols. . . . " (Wilder 1986, p. 193) .
The mathematical signs, symbols, formulas, diagrams and visual representations have an essential meaning within the different mathematical cultures. During the long development of the socio-historical culture, the development of mathematical signs and symbols as well as changes in their use and their interpretations can be observed (Steinbring 2009, p. 21ff ). Within the professional culture, mathematical symbols are used in an unequivocal and welldefined way by the participants in the common communication (see Heintz 2000) . Within the classroom culture the students are introduced to the use of mathematical signs and symbols; a variety and sometimes ambiguousness of emerging mathematical interpretations and of mathematical knowledge can be observed.
For learning mathematics, it is important to distinguish between the cultural conditions of professional mathematical research practice and the cultural conditions within schools and in mathematics instruction. Mathematics instruction in school cannot be understood simply as a teaching and learning activity, which is determined and regulated by scientific mathematics in a definite way. Mathematics instruction represents an autonomous culture, with a particular and independent type of (school) mathematical knowledge and mathematical language. It is a particular culture in which understanding and knowledge development take place in a self-referential way (see Bauersfeld 1982; Voigt 1998) .
"Participating in the process of a mathematics classroom is participating in a culture of mathematizing. The many skills, which an observer can identify and will take as the main performance of the culture, form the procedural surface only. These are the bricks of the building, but the design of the house of mathematizing is processed on another level. As it is with culture, the core of what is learned through participation is when to do what and how to do it. . . . The core part of school mathematics enculturation comes into effect on the meta-level and is 'learned' indirectly" (Bauersfeld, cited according to Cobb 1994, p. 14).
The interactive development of mathematical knowledge and understanding in general instruction takes place within a particular culture with its own interpretation of mathematical symbols and within this culture it requires particular learning and instruction activities in order to realize (school) math-ematical knowledge adequately as a process (Freudenthal 1973; Steinbring 2009 ).
Mathematical concepts as central knowledge elements in school
mathematics: Based on formal definitions or developed in processes of generalization?
Do the formal definitions contain all of the meaning of mathematical knowledge and mathematical concepts in school mathematics? Can an elementary mathematical theory be deducted precisely and in all its details out of defined basic concepts? Often one can find the thesis that the learning and the acquisition of mathematical knowledge is particularly successful if the knowledge elements are clear and unequivocal, and if the knowledge building is constructed logically and the course of learning is oriented along the deductive structure of the knowledge. According to such a conception, the mathematical knowledge in particular would play a central role in learning scientific knowledge. This leads to the following question: Is the finished, consistent mathematical knowledge that has been developed over thousands of years and is based on a solid axiomatic foundation at the same time the best basis for the learning process of the knowledge at school?
Two elementary examples -the number concept and probability -will serve to point out that an insightful understanding in school mathematical learning processes cannot start on the current foundations of scientific mathematics. An appropriate interpretation of the specific epistemological character of the solid, abstract axiomatic foundations of scientific mathematics -i. e. an appropriate theoretical description of their specific epistemological character -requires experience and proficiency in scientific knowledge as well as with scientific arguments and proofs, which a beginning mathematics leaner does not have, but which he has to learn parallel with the mathematical knowledge.
The elementary concept of the natural number surely cannot be introduced and understood in elementary school on the basis of the Peano axioms. An initial understanding of numbers for young students consists in experiences with the activity of counting. Numbers as quantities in order to count things from the children's experience is a self-evident first essential justification for the mathematical number concept. Such empirically concrete foundations of elementary mathematical concepts are common in elementary school. ". . . especially in elementary school, the meanings of symbols (signs) are related to empirical issues (numerals to materials, geometrical terms to the physical space, etc.)." (Voigt, 1994, p. 176 ).
The empirical relationship of numbers to objects in the real world could be a necessary and helpful beginning for the introduction into the number concept; but at the same time it could be later a severe obstacle for the development of structural arithmetical and algorithmic strategies of a comprehensive number concept. Contrary to the empirical use of the number concept in mathematics teaching, where numbers are conceived of as numbers of objects or as names of sets, this empiristic conception is fundamentally criticized from a philosophical and epistemological perspective. P. Benacerraf (1984) demonstrates by a philosophical and logical argumentation that numbers cannot be defined in a universal and definite manner by reduction to objects given unequivocally (objects existing in reality or mathematical objects as sets). The central consequence of this analysis is that numbers cannot be objects nor can they be names for objects.
"I therefore argue,. . . that numbers could not be sets, that numbers could not be objects at all; for there is no reason to identify any individual number with any one particular object than with any other (not already known to be a number)" (Benacerraf, 1984 , pp. 290/1.).
But if numbers are no objects what else they are then? "To be the number 3 is no more and no less than to be preceded by 2, 1, and possibly 0, and to be followed by. . . . . . Any object can play the role of 3; that is any object can be the third element in some progression. What is peculiar to 3 is that it defines that role -not being a paradigm of any object, which plays it, but by representing the relation that any third member of a progression bears to the rest of the progression. Arithmetic is therefore the science that elaborates the abstract structure that all progressions have in common merely in virtue of being progressions. It is not a science concerned with particular objects -the numbers" (Benacerraf, 1984, p. 291) .
Which important orientation could this philosophical interpretation offer for elementary arithmetic instruction in elementary school? Mathematical knowledge is ultimately abstract and characterised by varied structures. But in school, the learning process cannot start with abstract, axiomatic definitions. Yet, from the very first, one should keeping mind that for instance natural numbers cannot be taken as a basis by means of concrete things or empirical features. This dilemma between abstract formal definition and an insightful interpretation of numbers which necessarily refers to concrete things can only be dealt with if the material for illustrating and representing numbers is used in a way that the concrete material and its concrete features do not themselves 'define' the numbers, but rather in a way that makes actively constructed relations and structures within the material the basis for a theoretical foundation of numbers. In this way, school mathematics can, from the very beginning, become an elementary science of structures and patterns (Devlin 1997; Wittmann 2003) , in which the development of the number concept, following on to fractions, to negative, rational and real numbers happens by means of an increase in structures and relations.
Elementary probability theory offers a further example for the analysis of basic epistemological problems of school mathematical knowledge. Historical and epistemological research about the development of the concept of probability reveal that the relation between the foundation of a theory and its development is complex and difficult and cannot be understood simply as a logical-deductive process.
From the very beginning, probability theory focuses on analysing and modelling a fundamental polarity: The dichotomy between chance and regularity. The concept of probability acquires its specific function in such situations, in which it is no longer possible to make exact prognoses about future events based on strictly causal connections. In these situations, one is trying to achieve certain grades of certainty with the help of probability (Steinbring 1980) .
In early history of probability, simple, ideal situations are given in the form of games of chance, in which a direct form of randomness as well as a concrete structuring of law like aspects in the physical symmetry of chance devices and their use became manifest (cf. Hacking 1975 , Maistrov 1974 . The throwing of a die represents a natural form of randomness and disorder, for which possibilities of a regular model were offered simultaneously by means of the supposedly ideal symmetry. Largely not using mathematically precise definitions, those (ideal) games of chance constituted a 'concrete' elementary concept of probability for the prognosis of the occurrence or non-occurrence of certain events and for the determination of gradual certainties.
The relation between relative frequency and classical probability modelled in the empirical law of large numbers is in itself an issue to be mathematically analysed and described by rules and models. In the history of probability theory, Bernoulli's theorem provides an initial precise formulation for this mathematical relation (cf. Loève 1978) . Within this elementary theorem of probability, a particular epistemological requirement concerning theoretical mathematical knowledge becomes apparent.
The reflexive statement in Bernoulli's theorem saying that there is a very great probability that relative frequency and probability of the (ideal) chance experiment will come as close to each other as desired if the number of trials increases, is an expression of the circularity of the concept's definition and of the complementarity of empirical, experimental situations and (ideal) mathematical modelling.
Bernoulli's theorem required the abandonment of a supposedly deductive point of view in the development of knowledge and theory: what probability is can only be explained by means of randomness, and what randomness is can only be modelled by means of probability. This is where one accedes to those problems in the theoretical foundations of mathematics which, in a modern perspective, have become known as the circularity of mathematical concept definitions (in particular for the elementary concepts of probability, cf. Borel, 1965) . This circularity or self-reference implies that knowledge must be interpreted, at all stages of its development, as a complex structure which cannot be extended in a linear or deductive way, but rather requires a continuous, qualitative change in all the concepts of the theory.
Thus, the foundations of mathematical knowledge are not determined once and for all; when developing mathematical theory further, ultimately the foundations are modified as well. In the history of mathematics, this process of transformation has always played a role: The change of the foundations of any mathematical theory has at the same time changed the epistemological status of knowledge of these foundations.
Summary: 1. Mathematical knowledge as the subject of the discipline and as a subject in school requires different interactive ways of approaching it. Researching mathematicians use a professional discourse based on the body of rules of modern proof in order to reach understanding about mathematical objects, which are defined by conditions and postulates. Learning students understand and communicate about mathematics with generally understandable and illustration-bound conceptions about 'a priori existing' mathematical objects.
2. Mathematical knowledge cannot be imparted to students as a finished product, but an insightful understanding requires the students to carry out their own learning activities with respect to the features of the particular culture of mathematics learning and teaching.
3. The extension of mathematical knowledge -and particularly learning mathematics in school -is not simply an increasing quantitative accumulation of further mathematical facts, but it is a process of integration and generalisation of knowledge as well as of epistemological new interpretations of the foundations of mathematical knowledge.
